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While African governments and international donors generally support privatisation for 
stabilisation as an imperative of public finance problems, academicians are more inclined to 
discuss the efficiency gains of privatisation. Antithetically, some political economists argue that 
whereas African governments actually de-emphasise privatisation, donors mainly insist on 
privatisation to promote neoclassical views without offering an alternative to state reform. This 
paper realises that the main purposes of privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa have, so far, been 
multidimensional. It envisages, empirically, the determinants of privatisation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa using a probit model over the period 1970-1994. The results are supportive of the 






The literature on privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries in 
general is very complex and multidimensional. There is no clear consensus among 
governments, international organisations, and academicians as to what exactly is the purpose 
of privatisation. While African governments, the IMF, and the World Bank (donors) seem to 
target mainly stabilisation as an imperative of public finance problems with efficiency as a 
secondary axiomatic belief, much of the academic literature emphasises the efficiency and 
reversal of price distortions as gains of privatisation. On the other hand, as envisaged in 
Section III, some political economists have serious doubts about the intentions of both 
African governments and donors. According to these economists, while African authoritarian 
governments de-emphasise privatisation because of power loss, donors have mainly insisted 
on privatisation to promote neoclassical views of state minimisation without offering an 
alternative approach to state reform.   
Privatisation programs have been introduced by a number of African countries in the 
last two decades with the ostensible view to improving economic performance of public 
enterprises and creating a market economy. Yet the programs produced mixed results. In 
most of these countries poorly performing public enterprises were sold to the private sector 
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to relieve the government of heavy financial burdens and obviate macroeconomic problems. 
In fact, as shown below, it has been alleged that most Sub-Saharan African countries 
essentially privatise because of conditional assistance provided by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) subject to privatisation and other macroeconomic 
adjustments.
1 To maintain their power while submitting to such pressure, many authoritarian 
governments in Sub-Saharan Africa apply privatisation by favoring their allies. The 
expectation, therefore, is that X -inefficiency might result in both the private and public 
sectors, or state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In addition, as Due (1993, pp. 1981-1988) points 
out by not exposing parastatals to open competition, a worsening of income distribution 
usually ensues. It has been argued by Bennell (1997, pp. 1785-1803) that public floatation of 
SOE shares has the added political and economic advantages of enabling relatively large 
numbers of citizens to acquire them. Otherwise, deferred public offerings, where the 
government stipulates that a certain percentage of shares will be sold to the public as time 
passes, can be considered. In the absence of stock exchanges, trust funds can be established 
that allow the government to keep SOE shares until they can be sold to the public. In fact, in 
some of these countries, privatisation policies were enacted for ideological and opportunistic 
goals. As Riddell (1999, pp. 309-335) contends, it is naïve to believe that government will 
execute income redistribution reforms that will challenge their political interests. In a general 
sense, the privatisation programs did not produce the desired efficiency gains since the 
incentive was to reduce government deficit and to advance political agendas rather than 
offering an opportunity to build a strong private sector. This study is, therefore, concerned 
with assessing the extent to which privatisation decisions a re subject to macroeconomic 
changes and political bias in selected Sub-Saharan African countries. 
The proclaimed efficiency gains of privatisation have been discussed extensively by 
numerous articles, including Brock and Magee  (1978, pp.  246-50), Becker  (1983, pp. 
371-400), Ake and Mohammed (1986, pp. 161-80), Clague (1991, pp. 507-30), Fernandez 
and Rodrik  (1991, pp.  1146-55), Bruton  (1992), Dollar  (1992, pp.  523-44), Bates and 
Krueger  (1993), Bradburd  (1993), Drazen and Grilli (1993, pp. 598-607), Campos and 
Esfahani (1996, pp. 451-85), and Rose-Ackerman (1998, pp. 35-57), among others. To our 
knowledge, none of these studies focused on the determinants of privatisation in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. 
We conjecture that economic policies follow a set of contracts  between the 
government (principal) and various interest groups (agents) that desire the promotion of a 
free market system or efficiency gains (profit maximisation). Alternatively, principal-agent 
contracts work under both complete certainty and uncertainty with and without perfect 
information and can form the basis of analysis. The theoretical principal-agent (P-A) model 
is intended to exhibit the expected profit maximisation (efficiency) conditions. At the outset, 
it becomes evident that profit-sharing is the underlying latent condition for the decision to 
privatise subject to (explained by) political motives and the inevitable macroeconomic 
problems. Specifically, while this study agrees and attempts to illustrate theoretically the 
efficiency benefits of privatisation, its main purpose is to attract attention, empirically, to the 
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macroeconomic determinants of privatisation and the political manner in which privatisation 
is applied. Demonstration of both the agreed upon (theoretical) efficiency gains and the 
claimed empirical questions are crucial as we allude to the resulting pernicious income 
distribution effects which may offset any efficiency gains. In addition, Adam  (1992) 
demonstrates that the efficiency gains from the reduction of agency problems is much more 
complex. Adam succinctly distinguishes between productive and allocative efficiency. He 
argues that privatisation can indeed lead to lower costs due to the ownership shifts and 
change in incentive structures which are related to agency problems. Besides, Adam argues 
that the issue of allocative efficiency, which aligns consumer prices with the marginal cost of 
production, is closely linked with the issue of market liberalisation and competition whereas 
state enterprises are either in natural monopoly sectors or present serious barriers to entry 
due to their size and advantageous access to technology and other inputs. Thus, for 
privatisation to be successful, it has to be linked to competition and regulation policy which 
has been ignored by both donors and the African governments. That is, unless deliberate 
private-public corruption of some African governments aiming at avoiding competition to 
reap monopoly rents is eliminated, privatisation is not likely to succeed. Therefore, the 
efficiency issue may have largely been a secondary axiomatic belief in the context of 
structural adjustment. Thus, to a large extent, the main focus has been on stabilisation 
policies aimed at the public finance imperative of adjustment where SOEs have been a net 
drain on the financial resources of the government. Theoretically, as Adam (1994) enunciates, 
under private ownership, firms will only remain in existence as long as they are viable; 
otherwise the market mechanism will reallocate their resources to more efficient uses. 
Practically, political bias and the alleged stabilisation of the macroeconomy are, in essence, 
externalities that stand in the way of the market mechanism. Hence, the present paper 
envisages empirically two questions: (1) is privatisation induced by macroeconomic 
problems (variables)? and (2) is privatisation politically induced? The question of income 
redistribution effects resulting from political bias, and whether or not privatisation leads to 
some reversal of private distortions, can be tackled elsewhere. Adam  et al. (1992), examine 
privatisation from an explicitly economic standpoint, focusing more on the specific effects of 
ownership transfer on economic performance as applied to the market structures and 
characteristics of many developing countries. Evidence derived from the apparent oppressive 
conditions in most of those countries and the increasing patterns of migration out of them 
suggest a worsening of income distribution. For example, in Sudan the public entities have 
essentially been sold to supporters of the regime, while successful traditional businesses have 
been overtaken and forced to leave their enterprise to party affiliates. The UNDP report 
reveals that in 1997 alone, 374.4 thousand Sudanese sought asylum in other countries, and in 
1994, 282.6 (per 100,000 people) were jailed.   
The next section will present a brief description of the underlying principal-agent 
model. Section III discusses the motives behind privatisation and the political economy of 
the related issues. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V offers some 
concluding remarks. 
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II. The Principal Agent Model: An Overview 
Although it is more commonly argued that the public sector is more X-inefficient, our 
study purports that in a political alliance scenario, both the public and private sector are 
subject to X-inefficiency. The neoclassical explanation focuses on agency theory, which, as 
Haskel and Sanchis  (1995, pp. 301-320) explain, examines the relationship between 
managers/owners and model managerial effort and d etermines effort in a contractual 
arrangement under asymmetric information. As discussed in Bös (1991) and Vickers and 
Yarrow (1993, pp. 111-32), these models predict that X-inefficiency is greater in the public 
sector if monitoring arrangements are inferior to the private sector. That is, if asymmetric 
information exists. However, the present paper takes the extreme, but realistic, assumption of 
symmetric information on the premise that when the private sector and public sector are 
politically allied for the same cause, they are inseparable. This accords with Johnston’s (1998, 
pp. 69-90) argument that in such entrenched corruption settings many citizens and investors 
see corruption as inevitable and reform as futile. As such, entrenched corruption diverts 
development resources and saps the political and social vitality that societies need. It also 
resists many of the institutional and civil service reforms commonly deployed in advanced 
nations. That is, as Johnson adds, entrenched corruption is pervasive, organised, and 
monopolistic with no meaningful political opposition or economic competition. After 
eliminating their competitors, the allied private and public sector officials can extract 
monopoly rents as enunciated in the African Development Report  (1997, pp.  79-164). As 
Klitgaard (2000, pp.  2-5) explains, systematic corruption distorts incentives, undermines 
institutions, and redistributes wealth and power to the undeserving. Klitgaard argues that 
when corruption undermines property rights, the rule of law, and incentives to invest, 
economic and political development are crippled. Rent-seeking is further compounded in 
these countries by discretionary allocation of foreign currency and foreign currency black 
markets. 
In the model the government acts as the principal (action-taker) and the collaborative 
entrepreneurs as agents. As such, privatisation actions are taken by the government. The 
extent of efficiency (inefficiency) will depend on the expediency with which the action is 
taken. To the extent that government politicises privatisation to gain more control by 
favoring interest groups that are loyal to the incumbent authorities, privatisation may yield 
perverse results. By trying to empower only loyal interest groups, the government is, in 
essence, moving to secure its political power by gaining full control of the economic activity 
of relevant constituents. That is, the authorities are deliberately entering into a contract to 
undertake economic activity. 
With the combination of risk sharing and access to information, the principal-agent 
problem offers a first-best solution if the interests of the two sides converge while 
information is shared costlessly. Under information asymmetry, however, a first-best 
solution is possible if and only if the principal monitors the agent’s actions and gains free 
access to information; otherwise second-best solutions are possible with the so-called agency 
loss arising. In the African situation, however, there is a virtual symmetry of information and 
shared X-inefficiency since the agent and the principal are inseparable allies through ethnic 
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It is generally presumed that the outcome is significantly influenced by the agents, and 
that agents actions are not readily observable by the principal. The principal can control 
some observable behavior of the agent through the investment (output) acquired by the 
principal and a known channel of predetermined contract whereby the principal observes the 
actions of the agents, through political support and so forth. When agents’ actions are based 
on unshared observation with the principal, the principal cannot detect whether the agent 
used his information in a way that best serves the principal’s interests. Thus, we run into a 
moral hazard problem. Plausibly, the principal has to determine a contracting rule that will 




III. Empirical Issues: Why Privatise? 
 
Privatisation programs have been introduced by a number of African countries in the 
1980s and the 1990s. The motives behind privatisation are complex and controversial. 
Importantly, the bulk of researchers are more inclined to believe that most African 
privatisations take place as part of a broader structural adjustment program under the 
auspices of international development agencies or the so-called “donors”, including the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
3 Both the World Bank and the 
IMF are concerned with the necessary macroeconomic stability as they see it, which usually 
entails fiscal discipline and privatisation. Among researchers are those who question these 
donor policies and discount the existence of entrenched corruption settings. This alters the 
adduced causal inferences in this paper and principal-agent relationships. Such a view is 
enunciated by Africanists such as Callaghy (1989, pp. 15-38), alleging that to cope with the 
Third World debt crisis, Western states and actors have brought to prominence the dominant 
neoclassical view of development to countries dependent on the World Bank and the IMF. 
 
2. Pratt and Zechauser (1985) and Ul Haque and Mirakhor  (1987) point out that the following principles came as a 
result of the principal-agent analytical framework: (a) when information access is expensive and the agency loss 
is highest, the interests of the principal and agent do not converge; (b) an optimal level of monitoring is 
maintained by the principal subject to the cost of monitoring; (c) under relatively expensive monitoring, 
monitoring will be reduced in quantity and/or quality; (d) within an array of real-life cases, successful monitoring 
of such indicators as investment (profit) is at least partly effective in the reduction of agency loss; (e) good 
reputation which could be lost through inappropriate or litigious behavior; (f) repetitive actions will, over time, 
reduce uncertainty and mitigate the incidence of moral hazard; and (g) the benefits that accrue, as a  result of 
agency-loss reduction, will be shared by both the principal and the agent. Hence, both the principal and the agent 
are interested in finding an incentive and monitoring plan that gives outcomes similar to a free-information 
situation. The role of moral behavior in reducing agency loss has been succinctly addressed by Arrow (1970, 
1971).   
3. While many economists perceive structural adjustment programs adopted by the World Bank and IMF as market- 
oriented approaches of reform (including privatisation), these have been criticised by a number of African 
political economists as a discourse and practice of post-colonial international economy and not merely an 
economic program. See, for example, Blacking (1999, pp. 207-227). JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Central to this view are export-led growth and minimalists state, with the market being the 
major instrument of reform. Yet, Kahler (1990, pp. 33-62) points out, that except for trying 
to remove the state from the economy, neoclassical theory does not offer an alternative 
approach to state reform. This has posed a major impediment to effective economic 
adjustment in the Third World. It has, furthermore, been contended that the IMF and World 
Bank actions are antithetical to what they recommend. As Callaghy (1989, pp.  115-38) 
argued, much of their activity reinforces the role of the state to improve monitoring, 
data-gathering, parastatal reform, and privatisation of SOEs, among other things. It should be 
mentioned here that this paper argues that because African countries need these donors’ 
financial support as a result of perverse macroeconomic conditions, they submit to donors’ 
pressure to reduce government and privatise. To make sure that privatisation d oes not 
diminish their power, they apply it in a political way. 
Both Callaghy (1989, pp. 115-38) and Kahler (1990, pp. 33-62) contend that privati- 
sation was not popular among politicians in Sub-Saharan Africa before the 1990s. Politicians 
and managers of SOEs were afraid of losing power and jobs. Moreover, labor unions, which 
are mostly concentrated in SOEs were generally opposed to privatisation. Callaghy (1990, pp. 
257-320) argued that as independence came to Africa in the late 1950s, political rather than 
economic logic prevailed. He contends that a new political class began to emerge that used 
the state as its instrument of action and source of power, status, rents, and other forms of 
wealth. The state was used to begin building an economic base for itself. Thus, in contrast to 
the onerous private capitalist activity, all groups concentrated on the weak and vulnerable, 
newly autonomous state to reach power and wealth. The result was a formation of networks 
to build support through rent distribution, creation of a large parastatal sector, and purchase 
of urban support via state welfare services and subsidies. In this regard, although Callaghy is 
correct in questioning the prevalence of political motives of the ruling class, it can, 
nonetheless, be argued that corrupt politicians mainly continued along the same way of 
power and wealth formation inherited from their predecessors, the ex-colonisers. 
Notwithstanding, Callaghy’s (1990, pp. 257-320) point that new political groups attempted 
to use rents from the state to reward allies and, at the same time, crosscut and control 
complicated ethnic, regional, religious, clientelistic, and emerging class ties, is well taken. 
As a matter of fact, one major task of this paper is to investigate whether or not privatisation 
is politically-induced, and whether or not it is determined by donors' macroeconomic 
stabilisation policies. 
In the 1990s, however, many governments went a long way toward privatisation. 
Given political liberalisation and multi-party elections in some countries, such as South 
Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia, privatisation allowed newly elected governments to change 
previous statist policies. Mostly, the proliferation of privatisation in the nineties was a result 
of the relentless pressure of the World Bank and the IMF. As Callaghy (1989, pp. 115-38; 
1990, pp. 257-320; 1993, pp. 463-519) and Toye (1991, pp. 151-200) point out, irrespective 
of many privatisation failures in Africa, the World Bank and the IMF rushed to claim the 
success of reform endeavors. S everal factors are mentioned by the World Bank Report 
(1995) as testimony for this success. Two important contributors to success are divesture 
(degree of privatisation) and imposition of hard budget constraints (spending cuts or 
government shrinkage) on SOEs in lieu of the gradual decline of direct transfers, elimination SULIMAN AND GHEBREYSUS: DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATISATION 
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of direct and indirect subsidies, improving the price mechanism, and stipulation (control) of 
creditworthiness (loans) by lenders. Another important factor is administrative reform, 
through higher managerial expectations and more autonomy given to SOE managers. Yet as 
Bennell  (1997, pp. 1758-1803) argued, reform of SOEs becomes all the more important 
given that attempts of restructuring them, using performance and management contracts with 
existing managements, have not been successful. The World Bank report (ibid.) indicated 
that financial sector reform was crucially important in privatising SOEs. Clark (1998) reports 
that in 1990 African stock exchanges (excluding the dominant market of South African) had 
a total market capitalisation of $8.7 billion, or 5.9 percent of the continent’s total 
capitalisation. By 1995 this had increased to $26.9 billion, or 8.8 percent of Africa’s market 
capitalisation. The non-South African markets have risen a cumulative 211 percent over the 
five-year period. However, as Callaghy (1990, pp. 257-320) and Lipumba (1994) indicate, 
most of the ownership (shares) transfer has been acquired by the government’s close 
supporters. They are essentially the ones who have money to participate in the market. 
It is noteworthy that in his critical analysis of the World Bank’s  (1994) report, 
Lipumba (1994) points out that the dominant opinion among intellectuals in Africa is that 
structural adjustment programs are part of the problem rather than of the solution to the 
African economic crisis. The World Bank report (1994) argues that the growth rate of output 
(percentage change in per capita real GDP) remains low even for countries that have 
improved their macroeconomic performance because adjustment efforts have not gone far 
enough in areas of public enterprise reform and privatisation. The problem with this 
argument, as Lipumba (ibid) contends is that it is unrealistic to expect success of 
privatisation during the mid-1980s, the same period when macroeconomic adjustments were 
implemented. In the mid-1980s, the focus of reforms was on macroeconomic stabilisation 
and exchange rate adjustment. Part of the stabilisation package is privatisation (higher 
unemployment of workers previously working for SOEs) and devaluation of currency which 
means lower real wages (higher inflation). This (together with exchange controls) leads to a 
deterioration of the real exchange rate and foreign currency black markets’ proliferation. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
Evidence from the above discussion of several Sub-Saharan African economies 
suggests that sluggish economic performance that usually precedes policy-shifting of 
transferring public entities into private enterprises, forces those countries to reluctantly 
follow World Bank and IMF privatisation policies. It, furthermore, indicates that 
governments, in order to maintain their power, usually sell public entities to their allies based 
on ethnic (tribal) and/or religious affiliations. To be sure, many of the African countries have 
authoritarian regimes that impose a certain governing group with the intention of 
indoctrinating certain religious or tribal beliefs. To ensure complete power, privatisation has 
often been used to control the country economically and politically. Examples abound. Table 
1 presents a list of twenty-one such countries. Almost all of the African countries with 
authoritarian governments have adopted privatisation on pure political grounds. Therefore, 
although privatisation is ostensibly performed for efficiency purposes, the underlying 
motivations are, often-times, political. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Table 1  Size and Suspected Motivation of Privatisation, 1995 
Country  Size of Public Sector 
(% of GDP) 
Motivation 
Angola  64.1  ethnic 
Burundi  13.0  ethnic 
Cameroon  21.6  ethnic 
Central African Republic  26.6  ethnic 
Chad  29.4  ethnic 
Congo, People’s Republic of the  38.8  n/a 
Côte d’Ivoire  24.8  ethnic 
Djibouti  42.0  n/a 
Ethiopia  27.6  ethnic 
Ghana  19.6  ethnic 
Liberia  50.5  ethnic 
Madagascar  13.3  ethnic 
Mozambique  43.4  ethnic 
Nigeria  15.8  religious 
Rwanda  112.4  ethnic 
Somalia  51.3  ethnic 
Sudan  25.0  religious 
Uganda  15.1  ethnic 
Zaire  32.6  ethnic 
Zambia  32.6  ethnic 
Zimbabwe  45.0  ethnic 
Source: African Development Bank, African Development Report 1997 and information from various sources. 
 
Do the features of political motives explain why these political motivations resulted in 
privatisation of public enterprises? The answer can be clarified by conducting a probit 
analysis of privatisation endeavors conditional on political motives and macroeconomic 
characteristics. The data includes the twenty-one countries included in Table 1. Annual data 
over the period 1970-1994 has been used. Privatisation efforts and public reform in most of 
these countries started in the 1970s and intensified in the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, for 
comparative purposes the sub-sample 1980-1994 has been examined. The dependent variable 
( i Y ) is the decision (probability) of whether to privatise or not, given the country’s 
characteristics or the values of the explanatory variables (political motives and the specified 
macroeconomic variables). The dependent variable is a dummy variable where  1 = i Y  if the 
decision to privatise is significantly dependent on the described characteristics (or the six 
explanatory variables);  0 = i Y , otherwise. 
i Y , or the probability of privatisation decision is related to six variables listed in Table 
3. These variables are the size of the private (or alternatively public) sector (SP), per capita 
real GDP growth (DGDP), spending on defense (SD) - a measure of authoritarian power and 
budget deficit problems, changes in the real exchange rate (RE) - a measure of inflation and 
indicator of the size of the informal foreign currency market, control of banking ( CB)  - SULIMAN AND GHEBREYSUS: DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATISATION 
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access to lending (an indicator of banks’ (which are mainly government controlled) support 
to government allies, and an indirect indicator of inflationary pressures) , and affiliation to a 
party or ethnic group (AP). AP represents a dummy independent variable  i X , considered as 
follows:  1 = i X , if political motives (religious, ethnic, etc.) resulted in privatisation;  0 = i X , 
otherwise. To do this, numbers have been assigned to the politically motivated cases defined 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 2  Summary of Privatisation of Public Enterprises (1995-1999) 
  Transactions Completed  Transactions by Sector 








Trade  Other 
Angola  ..  56  ..  ..  ..  9  ..  29  9  9  275 
Burundi  ..  13  3  ..  ..  21  4  6  9  2  .. 





































Chad  13  6  ..  ..  ..  9  5  6  8  3  .. 
Congo, Dem.  44  15  ..  ..  ..  20  5  14  22  ..  .. 
Congo, Rep.  2  3  ..  ..  ..  3  1  6  10  1  .. 
Côte d’Ivoire 27  21  15  11  6  40  5  33  25  2  .. 
Djiboute  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Ethiopia  9  ..  ..  1  ..  ..  ..  6  3  1  115 
Ghana  23  20  27  4  8  44  8  101  50  30  .. 
Liberia  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Madagascar  24  ..  ..  ..  1  31  4  33  14  4  .. 
Mozambique  112  38  31  ..  ..  75  2  256  120  126  .. 
Nigeria  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  23  24  23  10  1  .. 
Rwanda  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  1  ..  1  ..  ..  .. 
Somalia  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Sudan  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  11  1  8  11  1  .. 
Uganda  23  18  2  ..  3  19  5  29  26  12  .. 
Zambia  60  91  55  16  10  71  6  69  102  20  .. 
Zimbabwe  ..  ..  3  ..  1  3  1  1  1  ..  .. 
Source: The World Bank, African Development Indicators 2001, p. 259. 
Note: The rest of the sample countries’ data is not available. 
 
The size of the public sector variable (SP) (or government deficit as a ratio of GDP) is 
intended to indicate the extent to which the existing degree of public deficits impinges on the 
decision to privatise. It has been argued that privatisation has been directed toward the public 
finance imperative of macro-stability where SOEs have been a net drain on the coffers of 
treasuries. The spending on defense variable (SD) is meant to show the extent to which 
governments in these developing African economies are insecure and would like to stay in JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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power at all expense, thus partly explaining their political motives to privatisation. 
Importantly, large spending on defense in most of these African countries has compounded 
the public debt problems. The real exchange rate (RE) is taken as the ratio of the foreign 
price (times the nominal exchange rate) divided by the domestic price. The consumer price 
index has been used as a measure of the domestic price. The foreign price is the price of the 
country against which the African country’s currency is pegged. Usually this foreign country 
is also the largest trading partner. The real exchange rate (RE) serves a dual purpose. Partly, 
as Campos and Esfahani (1996, pp. 451-85) contend, exchange rate deterioration and the 
concurrent high episodes of inflation result from inefficient politically-oriented policies 
which cause severe recessions and multiple downturns in the economy. This justifies the 
inclusion of the economic growth variable (DGDP). Using real per capita GDP will help 
alleviate the problem of heteroskedasticity (which is common in cross-sectional data) 
because it adjusts the different countries’ income by population size. To avoid the possible 
simultaneity (bidirectional causality) between this economic growth variable (￿GDP) and 
the size of the public sector variable (SP), we subtracted total government spending from 
GDP. That is, we used private spending plus net exports as an instrumental variable for GDP. 
Note that while the Keynesian model assumes that government spending is exogenous (a 
policy variable) to GDP, Wagner’s Law asserts that government spending depends on (is 
induced by) GDP  (Birrd (1971, pp. 1-26), Afexentiou et al.  (1991, pp. 316-333)). Hence, 
alleviating the possible simultaneity bias problem is important. Worsening of macro- 
economic conditions expedites the process of public enterprise reform, most of which may 
have become a burden on the public sector. In addition, the expansion of privatised schemes 
widens the foreign exchange gap as the need for more foreign capital arises. Foreign 
exchange is an absolute constraint on the success of privatised projects in that even if 
domestic saving is sufficient, domestic investment may still be low without the availability 
of foreign capital. Put differently, a salient explanation of the inclusion of the real exchange 
rate as an explanatory variable is the openness of trade prior to privatisation. 
Another variable is the control of the banking system to have ready access to selective 
lending ( CB) or soft credit.  To help their supporters in purchasing and improving the 
privatised firms, governments control the banking system and provide loans to supporters. 
Thus fraudulent schemes of creditworthiness determination are used. This usually happens 
through selective appointments to key positions in the banking system, ownership of certain 
banks, or nationalisation. As a proxy for this variable, we used the percentage change in total 
loans which will also act as an indicator of inflationary pressures. We could not find data on 
loans to privatised firms. 
Lastly, an important (dummy) variable is the degree of party (or ethnic group) 
affiliation (AP), based on the motivations shown in Table 1. Governments which undertake 
selective (political) privatisation usually belong to a certain party or ethnic group. Their 
policies are, thus, more likely to be partisan than nationalistic. Meanwhile, any expected 
efficiency benefits may have been thwarted through harmful income distribution effects. 
Based on the above, the signs of the coefficients which display the likelihood that 
privatisation is politically motivated are all apriori expected to be positive. It goes without 
saying, that the set of all explanatory variables collectively acts as proxy for the factors 
underlying the profit-sharing relationship (represented empirically by the decision to SULIMAN AND GHEBREYSUS: DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATISATION 
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privatise) between the principal (government) and agent (private firm) or privatisation 
beneficiaries. That is, the underlying latent profit-sharing (privatisation) decision between 
the government and its allies (agent) is a linear function (with parameter vector b) of the six 
prescribed explanatory variables. The dependent dummy variable  1 = Y , if the estimated 
prob ( 1 = Y ) is high (exceeds one-half) as can be approximated by the pseudo 
2 R . Hence, 
we hypothesise that the probability a regime will pursue political privatisation increases with 
the profit-sharing motives embodied in a state of nature explained by the set of the envisaged 
explanatory variables. The selection of these variables has been based on previous empirical 
works by Dollar  (1992, pp. 523-44), Campos and Esfahani  (1996, pp 451-85), and Plane 
(1997, pp. 161-78), among others. All of these studies, however, focused mainly on the 
effects of a specific variable on privatisation. To our knowledge, none of them envisaged the 
possible set of macroeconomic determinants of privatisation. There is also an abundance of 
evidence from these studies showing that this set of explanatory variables comprises a 
number of variables known to be adding to the underdevelopment problem of Sub-Saharan 
African countries. In this respect, there might be other variables of smaller effects that could 
have been included in the set, such as some measure of development (see Plane (1997, pp. 
161-78)). However, given that these variables might be correlated with the specified 
explanatory variables, we preclude such variables to maintain sufficient degrees of freedom 
for the probit model to be utilised in the analysis. This is all the more valid considering that 
higher development may yield ambiguous results as they may encourage or discourage 
politically motivated privatisation. 
The model used for testing can be explained as: prob ) 1 ( = Y = prob ) 0 ( > +e b X = 
prob ) ( b e X - > ; and prob ) 0 ( = Y  if  ) 0 ( £ +e b X . Therefore,   
 
i i GDP AP CB RE SD SP Y e b b b b b b b + D + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 .                 
 
i e  = random variable with zero mean and constant variance and c ovariance. Thus 
). , 0 ( ~
2 s e N i  It thus becomes clear that  i Y  is a measure of the decision (probability) of 
whether to privatise or not. Observe that the probability of  ) 1 ( = i Y  equals the probability of 
) 0 ( > +e b X  equals the probability of  ) ( b e X - >   or that the higher the value of  i X , the 
more the macroeconomic variables and political bias of country  i  are resulting in a higher 
likelihood that country  i  will privatise whenever it becomes politically feasible. 
The data sources are listed in Table 3. Equations 1 and 2 in Table 3 compare the 
distribution of predicted and actual outcomes (periods when privatisation occurred) for the 
full period 1970-94 and the sub-period 1980-90 (Equations 3 and 4). Because privatisation 
endeavors intensified in the 1980s and 1990s, we selected the subperiod 1980-1994, together 
with the entire sample period of 1970-1994. The statistical results essentially stayed the same 
indicating that the possibility of a structural shift after 1980 is not worrisome. 
As shown in Table 3, the model has a reliable goodness of fit level as measured by the 
pseudo 
2 R , ranging between .69 to .71 for the total sample period, 1970-1994, whereas the 
range was somewhat higher for the subperiod 1980-1994, ranging from .74 to .82. The 
higher range of probabilities for 1980-1994 is consistent with the intensified privatisation 
efforts during the 1980s and the 1990s. The model also makes correct predictions 89 percent JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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of the time. That is, most of the high values of the explanatory variables correspond to a 
dependent dummy variable value of unity (implying the decision to privatise), whereas most 
of the low values of the explanatory variables correspond to a dependent dummy variable of 
zero (implying the decision not to privatise). In addition, the coefficient estimates are 
consistent with apriori expectations indicating the correct signs and they are all statistically 
significant. Further, there is no cause for undue concern about heteroscedasticity. The 
absence of heteroscedasticity and the log likelihood transformation test stated by Greene 
(1997), suggests that the estimators are consistent. 
 
Table 3  Probit Estimation Results for the Period 1970-1994 and 1980-1994 
Equation  Constant







1970-1994                     














ꎭ19.75  .69  17.22 














ꎭ20.34  .71  11.31 
1980-1994                     














ꎭ21.10  .82  14.24 














ꎭ16.58  .74  6.59 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1997, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
World Bank, World Tables, 1994. 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
African Development Bank, African Development Report 1996. 
Notes:   
*  In the probability model  i i X Y E b b + 0 : ) ( , the normal equations are  ( )( )b
¢
- - = ￿ X X X X i i ) ( X X Y i i - ￿ =  
and  X  
0 ˆ ˆ b b - = (because 0 = Y ). Thus, the constant term is negative. To force the mean of the error term 
distribution to be zero, any non-zero fixed portion of the dependent variable is added to the constant term. That is 
the constant term changes by the difference between the sample mean of the error term and zero. 
1. The dependent variable ) ( i Y is a dummy variable. 
2. Numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios. 
3. The likelihood ratio (LR) =ꎭ2[log Lrestrictedꎭlog Lunrestricted] 
4. Heteroscedasticity Test = LRH =ꎭ2[log L rvꎭlog r] where LRH = the log likelihood function; rv = error variance in 
the sub-sample; r = error variance in the entire sample. 
5. Pseudo R
2 = {1ꎭ(1ꎭlog Lrestricted/log Lunrestricted)} 
6. The sample includes 21 countries listed in Table 1.   
 
The only variable that seems to be insignificant is the control of the banking system 
(CB). This might be a result of data contamination, since we were not able to find data other 
than the change in total loans from the banking system over the sample period. Ideally, it 
would have been better to include only loans to privatised firms. SULIMAN AND GHEBREYSUS: DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATISATION 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper examined privatisation episodes in a sample of Sub-Saharan African 
countries that were under authoritarian regimes as of 1970. After surveying the 
multidimensional motives of privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, the paper focused its 
attention on the macroeconomic instability and political motivations as essential 
determinants of privatisation in those countries. A brief theoretical discussion employed a 
principal-agent model to investigate the mutually beneficial profit-sharing collaboration 
between the principal (government) and the agent (privatised firm). That is, the theoretical 
discussion is intended to show efficiency gains (or stating of profit maximisation conditions) 
expected from privatisation. But the empirical question is whether privatisation is politically 
induced, besides being a result of macroeconomic problems. The empirical model identified 
a set of variables designed to act as a proxy that creates the right circumstances for an 
expedient agent to collaborate with the government (principal) based on religious or ethnic 
biases and control the country economically and politically. A rudimentary probit model has 
been used to do the empirical work. The results in general are supportive of the basic 
hypothesis that privatisation in the sample countries is induced by macro-instability and 
politically motivated. Thus, one of the reasons why privatisation is not very effective in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is that it needs to be linked to competition and regulation policy. 
Because of the simplicity of the probit model developed in this study, it is important to take 
the empirical results with caution. Surely, the model can be refined by incorporating more 
explanatory variables, and more importantly, by considering different subperiods and better 
specifications of the dependent, dummy, variable. Notwithstanding its limitations, however, 
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